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Who is the designer? As a Christian I hold that the Christian God is
the ultimate source of design behind the universe (though that leaves
open that God works through secondaty causes, including derived intelligences such as angels or teleological processes). But there's no way for
design inferences based on features of the natural world to reach that
conclusion. Design inferred from complex specified information in nature is compatible with Christian belief but does not entail it. This is as
it should be. Nature is silent about the revelation of Christ in Scripture'.
At the same time, nothing prevents nature from independently testifying
to the God revealed in the Scripture. The complex specified information
exhibited in natural phenomena is perhaps best thought of as God's fingerprints. Fingerprints never tell us the character of the one whose fingers are in question. But they can tell us that we are dealing with the
fingers of an intelligence, and this in turn can lead us to inquire into the
character of that intelligence. An information-theoretic design argument
therefore doesn't so much lead us to God as remove us from paths that
lead away from God.
FOR FURTHER READING
Behe, Michael. Darwin's Black Box: T7Je Biocbemical Cballenge to Evolution.
New York: The Free Press, 1996.
Dembski, William A. The Design I1~ference: Eliminating Chance Tbrougb Small
Probabilities. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision The0lY. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

- - - . No Free Luncb: W7JY Specified ComplexiZv Cannot Be Purchased 1,17itbout
Intelligence. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
Dembski, William A., and Michael Ruse, eds. Debating Design: From Darwin to
DNA. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Ratzsch, Del. Nature, Science and Design: T7Je Status of Design in Natural Science. Philosophy and Biology Series. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2001.
Rea, Michael C. World Witbout Design: T7Je Ontological Consequence of Naturalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
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A THOMISTIC
COSMOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT
W David Beck

CA) REFERS TO A WHOLE
class of arguments or patterns of thinking that have in common the conclusion that God is real because the things we see around us never exist
unless sometl1ing makes them exist. So, roughly, the CA concludes to
God as a first cause or initiating source of things because there cannot
be an infinite sequence of causes of the existence of the things around
us, those things that we observe as existing only because they are caused

THE TERM "COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT" (HEREAFTER

to do so.
We can distinguish types of the CA in several ways. First, most have
been based on observations of the real world. Some, however, have
been argued strictly on the basis of what is logically possible and necessary (see below).
A second critical distinction is between arguments that imply that God
is chronologically first in time versus those that conclude to a God as the
first cause in a concurrent sequence of dependent causes, all at the same
time. A third distinction is between those arguments that refer to the
whole universe as a single dependent object and those that refer only to
individual causal chains as the basis for needing a first cause.
Fourth, some arguments attempt to conclude to a full-blown concept
of God. This demands a rather complex argument. By contrast, many
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rather simple arguments arrive at the minimal conclusion of a first cause.
They will then add supplemental arguments that provide a fuller conclusion as to the nature of this cause.
This chapter is concerned with the classic form of the CA, first fully
stated by Aristotle and best known as developed by Thomas Aquinas.
We will begin with a historical overview.

A LITTLE HISTORY
Looking at the development of Greek philosophy, we see a step-by-step
unfolding of an argument delineating the source of the universe. What
drives it is the recognition of change, motion, the combining and recombining of chemical elements, that is, the dependency of things on an organizing, designing and driving cause. In Heraclitus it is a logos or lawfulness; in Anaxagoras it has become Mind.
The first time, however, that this becomes a real argument for an actual agent is in Plato. In his Phaedrus and in Laws, we have the key elements of the CA: (1) the things we observe are arranged in sequences
of causes and effects; (2) such sequences cannot go on endlessly; and
(3) the beginning point, or initiating cause, will be different from the
other causes in not being caused by something else. For Plato it is Soul.
Aristotle, Plato's student, carefully refines this argument into its standard format in his Metaphysics. He has a clearer concept of "infinite" and
provides a subargument as to precisely why there cannot be an infinite
sequence of causes of dependent things. He also provides some implications about the nature of this first cause that follow just because it cannot itself be caused but is precisely uncaused.
Little knowledge of Aristotle is preserved for Roman and early Christian Europe. It is, however, maintained in Arab culture and is central in
the development of Islamic philosophy. The version of the CA put forward by al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd and others understands the sequence of
causes as a chronological argument for a first cause of the universe backwards in time. This CA has come to be known as the kalam argument
and is the subject of another chapter.
By the twelfth centllly, Aristotle's Metaphysics had been brought to
Europe by way of the Muslim conquest of Spain. Enter Thomas Aquinas.
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What is most significant is his development of the argument within the
context of Christian theology. In the Summa T7Jeologica and in the
Summa Contra Gentiles he gives five brief statements of the CA that
have come to be known as the Five Ways, though they are not the same
in each book.
Following Thomas, the CA develops in a number of different directions. One is initiated by Duns Scotus. What he does is preface each
premise of the CA with "it is possible." The conclusion then is that it is
possible that an uncaused first cause exists. This is a quite different argument in that it proceeds solely on the basis of what is logically possible. Scotus argues that if an uncaused being is possible, then it is actual,
since nothing could limit its being. There are contemporalY versions of
this form found in the work of James Ross and others.1
By far the most important direction taken by the CA comes in the
eighteenth century at the hands of G. W. F. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke.
The notable addition to the CA is what Leibniz calls the principle of sufficient reason: nothing happens or exists without a reason. This transforms tl1e CA into a significantly different argument. First, it is now an
argument about the reason for the entire universe rather than its cause.
Second, it concludes to a God whose existence is necessalY, that is, who
exists in such a way that it makes no sense to ask the reason for the necessaly being's existence.
It is precisely this second point that forms the basis for an attack by
Immanuel Kant in his Critique oj Pure Reason (781). He holds that the
velY concept of a necessarily existing being is incoherent. The debate
over Kant's criticism continues, but its effect on the entire discussion of
the CA in the nineteenth century was devastating, even though Kant's
criticism only affects Leibniz's version of the CA.
A renewed discussion begins in the 1960s as a result of the work of
Bruce Reichenbach, William Rowe and others.2 Since then, the volume

lSee James Ross, Philosophical Ibeology (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).
'See Bruce Reichenbach, T7Je Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment (Springfield, III.: Charles
Thomas Press, 1972), and William Rowe, T7Je Cosmological Argument (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1998). The latter is an excellent source on the entire histOlY of the Leibnizian
argument. First published in 1975, this new edition keeps the discussion current.
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of published literature on this form of the CA and the principle of sufficient reason has exploded.
Another direction is taken by a tradition of late nineteenth and early
twentieth centmy philosophers known as Personalists. They actually
combined the CA with the teleological argument. Peter Bertocci, for example, argued that in fact there must be a self-sufficient source of our
universe and that what directs our search is its design. We must conclude
that there is a self-sufficient designing intelligence/creator of the universe. What was important to Bertocci and is to current philosophers like
Richard Gale, who uses a similar approach, is that this argument demands only a finitely intelligent God, which provides them an answer to
the vexing problem of evi1. 3
These three lines of development should not cloud the fact that the
standard CA itself continues to be developed following Thomas. This
process comes to an almost virtual standstill with the apparently successful critique leveled by Kant.
A renewed interest begins with the pronouncement of Vatican I,
which directed Catholic philosophers and theologians to resume the
study of Thomas Aquinas. This brought about a renewed discussion and
appreciation of the CA in the early twentieth centmy. Catholic philosophers like Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain were crucial here. Within
broader philosophical circles, and particularly among evangelicals, this
renewal of interest in Thomas's CA had to wait until the 1960s and the
work of Norman Geisler and others.

4

THE ARGUMENT

Our purpose in this chapter is to examine the traditional argument of Aristotle and Thomas. This argument is based on simple observations of
the world around us. It looks at causal connections as a concurrent series
and not one going back in time. It focuses on individual, actual se-

See Richard Gale, "A New Argument for the Existence of God: One That Works, Sort Of," in
17Je Rationality of 17Jeism, ed. Godehard Bruentrup and Ron Tacelli (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1999).
-'A good example of Norman Geisler's treatment is his Philosopby of Religion (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1974).
3
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quences and does not need to talk of the universe as a whole. Finally,
its conclusion is simple, with a minimal conception of God, and leaves
a fuller concept of God to subsequent conclusions.
The briefest and most general statement of Thomas's argument is
found in chapter fifteen of the Summa Contra Gentiles. It is also close
to its predecessor in Aristotle.
We see things in the world that can exist and can also not exist. Now everything that can exist has a cause. But one cannot go on ad i1?/initum in
causes .... Therefore one must posit something the existing of which is
necessary. (Summa Contra Gentiles 15.124, excerpts)

There are three basic points in this argument.
Premise 1: What we observe in this universe is contingent. This
argument begins with a simple observation conceming the things we see
andlmow about in the real world around us. It is not intended to be about
evelything in the universe, let alone every possible entity, only those
things we have actually observed. The key element in this first premise is
the notion of contingency. In this context this means that something owes
its existence to something else; it does not exist in and of itself.
So these causal relations are transferring not initiating. That is, A is
caused by B, but only as B is caused by C. Everything we know of possesses this sort of contingency: it exists and functions only as it is caused
by other factors in its causal chain. We know of nothing that by itself
spontaneously initiates causal activity. But note that nothing here tums
on our knowing about evelything. Even if something does turn out to
spontaneously initiate, it would have no effect on the CA.
Premise 2: A sequence of causally related contingent things cannot be infinite. The point of the second premise is to show that regardless of how complex and interconnected, and regardless of how extensive they may be, the sequence of causally related contingent things is
not infinite. Thomas at one point uses the picture of a hand moving a
stick moving a ball. Perhaps the most frequently used analogy in recent
discussions is the train.
Imagine seeing a train moving past you for the first time. Baffled, you
wonder how the boxcar is moving. You come to realize that it is being
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pulled by another boxcar in front of it, and so on, and so on down the
tracks.
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concurrently causally dependent, contingent things.

This allows us to visualize the various naturalistic scenarios, so com-

Conclusion: There must be a first cause in the sequence of contingent causes. If the causal sequence is finite, then there is a first cause

monly heard in our society, that describe how it is that things exist in
the real world. "The cosmos is a great circle of being," we are told. But

regardless of how many causes there might be in the series. This concept
of "first cause" involves two component concepts. To say that it is the .first

stringing boxcars all the way around in a circle until the last one hooks
up to the first will still not explain the motion even of the first boxcar.

cause is to say that it neither requires nor has a cause itself. First is first!
Thus it is fundamentally different from every other cause in the system:

And likewise, if contingent things cause each other to exist in a circle,
there is no initiating of the causality. The naturalist offers another more

it is not contingent. It depends on, is limited by, or exists because of absolutely nothing else. It does not pass on causality it receives in a trans-

promising scenario: "The cosmos is an intricately evolved ecosystem in

ferring relation; rather it strictly initiates causality. It is itself uncaused.

which everything is related causally to everything else." So boxcars clutter the world in an unimaginably complex system of railroads such that

To say of the conclusion that it is tl1e first cause is to define its relation
to evelytl1ing else in the sequence: namely, that it is their cause. It is the

in some way evelY boxcar is coupled to and pulling the first one. We
still have no accounting for the motion of that first boxcar and likewise
for the existence of actual things.

cause of all things in that it initiates all of the causal activity in the sequence,
without negating tl1at each cause is, in fact, a cause in its own right of the

It is always tempting, of course, to say that it is just enough to know

The only explanation for the moving line of boxcars is that somewhere there is a locomotive powerful enough to pull the whole train

that the one in front of it is pulling each boxcar. In one sense it is clearly
true that boxcar A is pulled by boxcar B. But B can pull A only because
at the same time C is pulling B. The pulling action of B is transferred
from C. And so it is also true that A is being pulled by C. The same is
true, of course, about D, and about E, and so on.

following one in the sequence, and is an effect of the proceeding one.

while itself not needing to be pulled. And so the concept of a first cause
is richer than it might at first appear. It is the initiating cause of existence
of everything in the series of causes and exists without any cause or dependency whatsoever. It is strictly an uncaused cause.

One last option suggests itself. Suppose that there are infinite boxcars,
or as the naturalist says: "The intricacy of the universe is lost in infinite
complexity." But infinite boxcars, no matter how complexly arranged,
still leave unexplained why our first boxcar is moving and hence why
any are. Letting the sequence go to infinity fails to explain anything. It
just puts off infinitely the question of what initiates the causality.

Premise 3: The sequence ofcausally dependent contingent things
must be finite. The rest of the CA simply draws the obvious conclusion
from premise 2. If the sequence cannot be infinite, then it must be finite.
There is, of course, one other alternative, just as there is one way in
which the line of boxcars can be infinite, namely, if they are not moving
at all. There might of course be infinite boxcars in the train, but there
could not be a moving train that consisted only of an infinity of boxcars.
Just so, there might exist infinite things but not an infinite network of

WHAT FOLLOWS ABOUT GOD'S NATURE?
The fairly simple argument of Aristotle and Thomas gives us no more
than a first cause. It does, however, set up a series of subsequent arguments that fill in a good deal of content and provide a preface of something we are more justified in calling God.
For the most part, these subarguments go back to Parmenides. He was
something of an oddity in Greek philosophy by thinking that the universe is just one simple uncaused thing and not a network of casually
connected things. It is precisely this notion that pushed him to ask what
characteristics the universe must possess if it is in-and-of-itself or necessaly. But notice that this is exactly where the CA leaves us too. What follows from the fact that something is a first cause, that is, entirely without
cause while causing all relevant effects?
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Uniqueness. Why think that there is only one first cause? It seems to
me that in fact many of the versions of the CA have been directed at precisely this goal. The obvious way to do it is to find a way to make the
CA an argument about the entire universe, and the best way to do that
is to incorporate some principle that includes all possible reality, for example, the principle of sufficient reason. But this is not the tactic taken
by Aristotle and Thomas.
The subargument they use can be simplified like this. Imagine there
are two first and uncaused causes. Call them FC1 and FC2. What is it that
distinguishes them and hence determines that they are two, not one?
What controls our thinking here is the logical principle that two things
that do not differ in any respect at all are just the same thing.
Put briefly, the only way FC2 could differ from FC1 would be for it to
have some characteristic that FC1 does not. But if FC1 lacks something
that is available (since FC2 has it) then it is limited or caused not to have
it. But that is impossible since FC1 is not caused in any way. And so we
have to conclude that any two-or more for that matter-uncaused first
causes would have to be identical in the strict sense, and therefore there
could only be one of them.
Simplicity. That God is "simple" is a difficult but crucial concept. It
means at least the following: (a) God has no parts and is therefore not
material (made of measurable units); (b) God does not change, that is,
he cannot add or subtract parts of what he is; (c) God is all one thing.
There is not one part of him that is distinguishable from others. He simply is what he is.
All of the meanings given to simplicity imply that God has parts, that
is, that God has internal differences. The Bible sometimes seems to refer
such things to God, just as we correctly do to human persons, such as
changing his mind, or being somewhere (such as a burning bush) but
not somewhere else. With some people he seems to act judgmentally.
With others he is loving and forgiving. How are we to understand this?
The argument here is a version of the argument for God's uniqueness.
Any differences between parts would involve a lack of something in one
of them. Such a lack would have to be a limit due to some cause, but
that is impossible for an uncaused first cause.
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These two arguments might seem abstract or irrelevant at first glance,
but they play quite important roles in a larger conception of God. That
there is only one God is crucial enough, and so is the point that God is
what he is without change. Put together, these arguments form boundaries for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. That is, there is only one
God, not three, and he does not have internal divisions or parts. The biblical data has to be compiled in a way that fits these logical boundaries.
Peifection. An uncaused first cause, existing in and of itself, must
therefore be perfect. This is simply the reverse of the argument used in
the first two points above. If God has no limitations in what he is, then
he is simply unlimited.
The difficulty here is that we do not have any really positive meaning
to this notion. When I say that I am 5'11" tall or that I am sitting at my
desk, I am actually describing my limitations. My size is confined in certain ways, as is my presence in the room, as well as in the world. God,
it turns out, must be described avoiding any limitations. Expressing that,
however, can be accomplished only by consistently denying definitions
of God. For example, God is not spatial. We say this by using the term
omnipmsent. But that should not be taken to mean that God is located
in evelY space. Rather, he is just not located in any sense. And this is to
be applied to every description of God. Thus a seemingly empty term,
applied to God, turns out to generate a great deal of important theology.
We have come to call it "perfect being theology."
Personhood We are still left with a rather abstract, nonrelational or,
in general, nonpersonal being at best. Does anything follow from the CA
that would indicate that God has personal characteristics?
Both Aristotle and Thomas do have subarguments that God possesses
knowledge and will. Aristotle's God, however, is nonrelational, knowing
only himself. Thomas, however, shows that God's knowing of himself as
first cause of all things does in fact involve a perfect knowing that is truly
relational.
I want, however, to mention here a simpler argument for personhood
that flows from the CA. Among recent philosophers, it can be found in
Norman Geisler's discussions. Put briefly, since the universe contains persons who are rational, social, moral and free, how could the first cause of
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all things be any less than a person? In particular, if the first cause is both
uncaused and explains itself, then it must be free, not determined.
There is much more to be said here as to what can be developed out
of the CA. This, however, is enough to show that Thomas's simple argument does provide the basis for a fuller concept of God.
SOME BASIC OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT

During our discussion of the argument we have dealt with a number of
problems, objections or alternate views. Here I want only to bring up
two vety general objections to the CA.
First, certainly the most frequent criticism of the CA is that there is no
reason to think that it concludes to God. Even if it were a sound argument, the objection typically goes, it only gives us a first cause. This
could well be some space/time factor, say, the big bang or elementaty
particles of some sort, but not an infinite creator God who loves us and
desires relationship and worship.
Any response to this objection will first have to pose the question of
what it takes to identify someone. Specifically, what characteristics do you
have to know in order to identify someone? Clearly one answer is that you
need only one, if it is a uniquely identifying characteristic. If only one object in the universe has a specific property, and even if that is the only
property I know, then I am able to correctly identify tl1at object.
Given that principle, we should say that strictly speaking the minimal
CA discussed above, by itself, does not uniquely identify God in its conclusion. However, that there must be finite links in every causal network
and thus a first, uncaused cause is already enough to defeat most forms
of atheistic naturalism which hold that the universe is a closed causal
network.
More important, of course, the CA has immediate implications that do
provide unique identifiers. So a good strategy is to leave the argument
as simple as possible rather than burden it with all sorts of complex premises that only demand additional, often difficult and only moderately
probable premises.
There are those who still object, including some Christian theists, that
even with all the subarguments we are left with an abstract, impersonal
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something that does not demand religious worship. The best response
is to agree: the CA proves only what it proves. Certainly we will want
more and different kinds of input, including revelation and experience.
This further objection often supposes that unless we know evetything
about God, we know nothing. But this is not only obviously false-I certainly know many things without knowing evetything about any of
them-it is also self-contradictOlY since the objector clearly does not
know evetything about the objection. I conclude that the argument
yields a little but crucial and uniquely identifying knowledge of God.
A second frequent objection makes the point that infinite series are possible. Since the CA depends on a denial of an infinite series of causes, the
argument fails. It is, of course, tme that infinite series are possible. The
sequence of cardinal numbers, as we all learned in elementaty school, is
infinite. We could assign a cardinal number to each member of any causal
sequence, and we would then have an infinite sequence of causes.
This objection occurs in many forms, but they all overlook the specifics of the sequence of causes in the CA. There are four characteristics of
this series and each is cmcial to eliminating the possibility of infinity. (1)
It is a sequence, a connected series of causes to effects. (2) Each cause
is itself contingent. It, in turn, needs a cause. (3) The dependency in the
Aristotelian/Thomistic CA is concurrent not chronological. It refers to
concurrent dependency relations of cause and effect. (4) The specific relation to which the generic CA refers is the causing of existence itself.
The key point in the CA is that there cannot be an infinite series of
causes with all four of the above characteristics, not that there cannot be
infinite series of other types.
Note that, given this point, it is irrelevant to the argument whether the
universe itself might be infinite. Thomas thought that it is at least possible that the universe exists in infinite time, as Aristotle had held. That
God created the beginning of time we know only by revelation. Many
objections attempt to show that in some respects the universe is infinite,
so the CA must be wrong. Attached to this is typically that Thomas's
physics is just wrong. But this is all irrelevant to the CA. It shows only
that there cannot be an infinite sequence of concurrent dependent
causes of existence.

r
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CONCLUSION: WHY Is THIS ARGUMENT IMPORTANT?
It is clear that Thomas intended this argument to playa critical role in

our understanding, not just of God and religion but, as it did for Aristotle,
of everything. We cannot make sense of our reality at all apart from God.
The God of the CA best explains life as we experience it.
At the same time this argument is not a starting point. It is based on
other arguments and observations, and so God is also a conclusion from
the evidence. My point here is that one way in which the CA is important
is that it demonstrates that God is not a belief or a creation of faith but
part of our true description of things. So the CA is tremendously valuable
for apologetics.
This argument along with its subarguments is also vital in setting logical guidelines for theology. We mentioned earlier how it helps us in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, but there are many other applications.
The CA demands that God is unchanging. Applied to God as knowing,
choosing, willing or acting in any way at all, we will have to see "unchangingly" as a filter that always modifies our understanding of how
God is to be conceptualized. If we extend this to all of the aspects of
God's nature that are identified in the various subarguments of the CA
and then apply them in turn to each of God's actions, we have built a
framework for theology: a perfect being theology.
Finally, the CA is important for us in doing science. It specifies the
relationship between God's acting and the processes of science, including the behaviors of human beings. It says that God is the true sourcethe first cause-of all processes, evelY event and even evelY free action.
We must note that this concept does not eliminate, replace or reduce the
necessity of doing science. It is not a god-of-the-gaps view. It respects
the proper place of science; in fact, it grounds science by explaining why
it is even possible.
This brings us back to the original question of how the universe operates and the subsequent moves in philosophy that culminate in Aristotle's and Thomas's arguments. The CA can be seen as establishing or
underwriting a worldview: a big-picture understanding of how evelYthing works-namely, theism, as opposed to naturalism.
I have argued that cosmological thinking is important to our large un-
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derstanding of evelything. There is much work yet to be done on the
CA, and it may well be that faults will be found with our current ways
of wording this argument. The objections that have been brought against
it over virtually the entire history of both western and eastern philosophy either fail or only point out the obvious limitations of the CA. It remains an essential part of a Christian apologetic.
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